Business Ecosystem and Reverse Salient: The Development of the Mobile Music Business in Japan and Korea by Takeishi, Akira & Lee, Kyoung-Joo
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
All Sprouts Content Sprouts
11-1-2008
Business Ecosystem and Reverse Salient: The
Development of the Mobile Music Business in
Japan and Korea
Akira Takeishi
Institute of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University, takeishi@iir.hit-u.ac.jp
Kyoung-Joo Lee
Integrated Research Institute, Tokyo Institute of Technology, leekjoo@hotmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/sprouts_all
This material is brought to you by the Sprouts at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in All Sprouts Content by an
authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Takeishi, Akira and Lee, Kyoung-Joo, " Business Ecosystem and Reverse Salient: The Development of the Mobile Music Business in
Japan and Korea" (2008). All Sprouts Content. 170.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/sprouts_all/170
Working Papers on Information Systems ISSN 1535-6078
Business Ecosystem and Reverse Salient: The Development
of the Mobile Music Business in Japan and Korea
Akira Takeishi
Institute of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University, Japan
Kyoung-Joo Lee
Integrated Research Institute, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan
Abstract
This paper aims at exploring a mechanism of new business development. To understand how
a business develops, we move our analytical focus from the level of a focal business to the
level of the âbusiness ecosystem,â a collection of related businesses and institutions.
We pay special attention to a slowly advancing component as a âreverse salient.â We
comparatively examine the developmental process of the mobile music business in Japan and
Korea, and show how the interactions among related businesses and music copyright
institutions as a reverse salient shaped the directions and speed of the development in each
country.
Keywords: Business ecosystem; reverse salient; mobile music business; new business
development
Permanent URL: http://sprouts.aisnet.org/6-52
Copyright: Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works License
Reference: Takeishi, A., Lee, K. (2006). "Business Ecosystem and Reverse Salient: The
Development of the Mobile Music Business in Japan and Korea," Proceedings > Proceedings
of Helsinki Mobility Roundtable . Sprouts: Working Papers on Information Systems, 6(52).
http://sprouts.aisnet.org/6-52
                             Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/6-52
 
 
Business Ecosystem and Reverse Salient:  
The Development of the Mobile Music Business in Japan and Korea 
 
Akira Takeishi 
Institute of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University 
takeishi@iir.hit-u.ac.jp 
 Kyoung-Joo Lee 
Integrated Research Institute, Tokyo Institute of Technology 
leekjoo@hotmail.com 
 
Abstract: This paper aims at exploring a mechanism of new business development. To 
understand how a business develops, we move our analytical focus from the level of a 
focal business to the level of the “business ecosystem,” a collection of related 
businesses and institutions. We pay special attention to a slowly advancing component 
as a “reverse salient.” We comparatively examine the developmental process of the 
mobile music business in Japan and Korea, and show how the interactions among 
related businesses and music copyright institutions as a reverse salient shaped the 
directions and speed of the development in each country. 
 
Keywords: Business ecosystem; reverse salient; mobile music business; new business 
development 
 
1. Introduction  
When technological innovations offer a new business potential, firms strive 
for prosperity and survival by creating a new business. For them it is critical to 
properly understand how a new business is created and developed over time. In 
particular, when a variety of new business ideas emerge and compete with each other, a 
proper understanding of business development is indispensable. Yet, it is often hard to 
foresee how a business potential might materialize. Without better understanding, 
firms may overlook critical success factors and err in their management of the 
situation. 
This paper explores a mechanism by which a new business is created and 
developed. We achieve this by moving our analytical focus up from the level of a 
particular business of interest to the level of a collection of related businesses. We 
argue that it is critical to look at complex interactions among various types of 
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businesses as well as related institutions to understand the development process of a 
business.       
The goal of this paper is to adopt the concept of a “business ecosystem” 
(Moore, 1993; Iansiti and Levien, 2004), which consists of a variety of interdependent 
businesses and relevant social institutions, to understand the process of business 
development. We show the value of looking at the level of a collection of businesses, 
rather than at the level of a focal business stand-alone. In particular, we demonstrate 
the importance of paying attention to a “reverse salient” (Hughes, 1983, 1987), which 
refers to the part that has fallen behind in progress within the whole ecosystem. We 
analyze the role and impact of a reverse salient on the developmental path of the 
business ecosystem as a whole and the way in which it would affect the directions and 
speed of the development of a focal business.       
Empirically, this paper deals with the mobile music business, a business that 
provides music to consumers through mobile internet, in Japan and Korea. We 
comparatively examine how the mobile music business developed since the late 1990s 
in these two countries from the perspective of the business ecosystem with a focus on 
the influences of music copyright institutions as a reverse salient.         
 
2. Analytical Viewpoint    
 A natural unit of business analysis is the market. A market consists of 
competing business firms that provide mutually replaceable goods or services. A 
particular business is formed for a particular market, and competition among the firms 
within the market drives changes. Industrial organization economics, for example, 
analyzes the relationship among market structure, the strategic behaviors of firms, and 
industrial performance. Porter’s competitive strategy analysis (Porter, 1980) was based 
on the framework of industrial organization economics, and a rich and fruitful stream 
of strategic research has drawn on a similar framework.        
However, when disruptive technologies bring about a new business potential, 
this type of single-business level analysis may not be sufficient. The emergence of a 
new business is often not without the influence of other interdependent businesses and 
relevant social institutions. In such cases, stand-alone analysis at the level of a focal 
business cannot give us a satisfactory explanation as to the nature of business 
development. Thus, we need to raise our analytical viewpoint to a higher level of 
analysis. The business ecosystem perspective could serve this purpose.         
A business ecosystem is a loosely coupled system that consists of a focal 
business and other types of interdependent businesses. It also encompasses 
organizational actors and their relevant environmental components, such as markets, 
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technologies, and institutions, which are related to the constituent businesses. Thus, in 
the business ecosystem model, a particular business is not viewed as a stand-alone 
entity, but rather as a part of a whole business ecosystem that spans a variety of 
businesses. The ecosystem presumes a dynamic process in which interdependent 
businesses evolve in an interactive manner as changes in a business set the stage for 
reactive changes in other industries (Moore, 1993; Iansiti and Levien, 2004). 
For most cases, the business ecosystem perspective might be irrelevant. 
During a normal period, when technologies and other environmental factors are more 
or less stable, constituent businesses remain independent of one another. Each business 
can be managed and changed without being influenced by other businesses, and the 
firms within it can behave rather freely without the need to pay much attention to other 
firms outside of their business. 
However, during periods of disturbance, caused by, for instance, radical 
technological innovations, the business ecosystem does matter. Critical inter-business 
relations surface, and this necessitates negotiations, coordination, and rearrangement 
within the ecosystem. It is during these periods of radical change that the business 
ecosystem perspective serves as a valuable viewpoint for understanding business 
development. This is especially true in the field of information and communication 
technologies (ICT), where discontinuous innovations arrive cyclically at frequent 
intervals, and technological impacts cut across various businesses and industries 
(Sampler, 1998). Here, the business ecosystem perspective is expected to make a great 
contribution. 
When we analyze business development at the level of the business 
ecosystem, a holistic viewpoint would enable us to identify a part or component that 
obstructs the system development as a whole. While technological innovation initiates 
radical changes and affects a variety of businesses, each component in the ecosystem 
exists in a different context with different interests and develops at a different speed. 
When a change in a component disturbs the existing balance, corresponding changes in 
other components should be made in order to regain balance and order within the 
whole ecosystem. In this process of change, a ‘reverse salient’ refers to the part or 
component that has fallen behind or out of phase with the others (Hughes, 1983, 1987). 
It hinders the whole development of the ecosystem. Thus, a reverse salient plays a key 
role in setting the direction and speed of business ecosystem development and in 
shaping the structure of the focal business. A reverse salient could not be recognized 
from the focal business stand-alone viewpoint. Rather, it is recognized only when you 
look from the level of the business ecosystem.             
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3. Research Design and Data   
The empirical field of this paper is the developmental process of the mobile 
music business in Japan and Korea. This is a business that allows consumers to use 
mobile phone handsets to replay music files that are downloaded through the mobile 
internet. Both Japan and Korea have been at the forefront of mobile internet diffusion 
and development in the world. The mobile music business in both countries has grown 
rapidly to become the largest market among mobile internet businesses and to establish 
a notable position within the music industry. Although the basic technologies and 
structure of the business look similar in both counties, substantial differences exist in 
some dimensions, such as how fast new businesses were developed, who became 
winners or losers in the competition, and the size of the market.           
How has the mobile music business in both countries been created and 
developed? What is the underlying mechanism behind their divergent developmental 
path? The goal of our empirical study is to answer these questions by analyzing the 
business development at the level of the business ecosystem with a focus on a reserve 
salient.   
The mobile music business is served by mobile content providers (CPs) that 
produce music files and supply the files to customers via mobile internet. However, the 
business does not function in a stand-alone manner. It is surrounded by a variety of 
related businesses and institutions, all of which constitute the mobile music business 
ecosystem together with related technologies and markets. They include the mobile 
communication network business, the mobile handset business, the music business, 
music copyright institutions, and the government bodies that design and implement 
public policies and regulations on mobile communication. We will analyze how the 
components within this ecosystem interact, negotiate, and coordinate with each other 
during the process of developing the mobile music business.  
As a reverse salient of the developmental process, we pay special attention to 
music copyright institutions. There are two reasons for this. First, all music related 
businesses must deal with music copyright issues in order to successfully implement 
their businesses. Second, music copyright institutions do not change rapidly. Since 
music copyright laws and rules involve various businesses and public organizations, 
each with its own interests that often conflict with the interests of the others, any 
change in music copyright institutions occurs slowly and requires substantial energy. 
The copyright institutions, therefore, are likely to fall behind the changes made by 
others, such as technological innovations and strategic moves made by some firms, to 
become a reverse salient in the overall mobile music business ecosystem.        
Other components could also be viewed as a reverse salient. Yet, for the 
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reasons mentioned above, this paper focuses on music copyright institutions, and we 
analyze how they set the directions and timing of the mobile music business 
development. An institution here refers to any one of the varying types of 
arrangements that govern and constrain social and economic activities. It includes not 
only formal arrangements, such as law, rules, and public institutional bodies, but also 
informal ones, such as habits, customs, and widely shared views, which also influence 
how a business is run. 
The following analysis is based on the information and data collected as of 
the summer of 2005 from our interviews with practitioners, reports, statistics, and 
articles available in Japan and Korea1. The appendix shows a short history of the 
mobile music business in the two countries to be covered in this paper.    
 
4. Developmental Process of the Mobile Music Business in Japan and Korea  
4.1. Overview of the Mobile Music Business in Japan and Korea  
Japan and Korea are ahead of other countries in the diffusion of mobile 
internet services 2 . Among various mobile internet services that have emerged, 
music-related services have been most successful in the two countries. They 
established the largest market and drove the further development of mobile internet 
businesses. To date, the services described in Table 1 have been available in both Japan 
and Korea.       
These mobile music businesses rapidly grew into a large market. The most 
notable was Japan’s ringing melody (“Chaku-Mero”) service. The revenue from 
ringing melody sites was 700 million U.S. dollars in 2002, accounting for 40% of the 
whole mobile content market. As a 3G music service, KDDI launched a ringing song 
service (“Chaku-Uta”) in December 2002, and then started a full-track music 
download service (“Chaku-Uta-Furu”) in November, 2004. With immediate successes, 
the market size of these services grew to be 1.1 billion US dollars in 2004 (see Table 
2).  
                                                 
1 The firms we interviewed include NTT DoCoMo, KDDI, Vodafone, JASRAC, Yamaha, Xing (Japan), 
KAPP, Danal (Korea). The list of the reports we used for analysis, not shown in this paper, will be 
provided upon request to the authors. 
2 As of January 2002, mobile communication subscribers amounted to 66% of the total population in 
Japan and 76% in Korea. Among the subscribers, those owning handsets with a mobile internet function 
amounted to 86% in Japan and 92% in Korea in 2004. Mobile internet services, embodied in the 2.5G 
mobile communication system, were first launched in February 1999 in Japan and September 1999 in 
Korea, and grew rapidly with e-mail and content services. Both countries then moved to a 3G mobile 
communication system in October 2001 in Japan and June 2002 in Korea.  
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In Korea, the ringing melody service (“Bellsori”) was also the most popular 
mobile content service. The ringing melody market grew to be about 80 million US 
dollars, while the ring-back song (“Coloring”) market grew to nearly 30 million U.S. 
dollars. Together, they accounted for about a half of the 230 million U.S. dollar total 
mobile content market in 2002. In November 2002, SKT began providing ringing song 
(“Livebell”) and full-track music download (“MOD”) services simultaneously. Then in 
November 2004, SKT launched its U-Music (Ubiquitous-Music) service – the first 
time this service was offered in the world. Korea was behind Japan in launching 
ringing melody and ringing song services, but then moved ahead by introducing 
full-track music download and U-Music services. Maintaining high momentum for 
changing the way music is distributed to customers, the mobile music business in 
Korea finally outgrew the traditional offline music business in 2004 (see Table 2).      
 
4.2. Ringing Melody Service in Japan and Korea  
 The ringing melody service was the most successful during the early days of 
mobile internet business development in both Japan and Korea. The service in Japan 
established the world’s largest internet music market, including both wired and mobile 
music download services. Whereas the world internet music download market 
(excluding ringing melody in Japan) was estimated to be 341 million US dollars in 
2004, the Japanese ringing melody market had already reached 664 million US dollars 
by 2002. While there were several factors to explain this success, Japan’s copyright 
management institution played a key role in the smooth and rapid development of the 
ringing melody service (Takeishi and Lee, 2006).     
As ringing melody services use only the melody of original music, the 
copyright fee is paid only to the composer. In Japan, the majority of music copyrights 
are managed by JASRAC (the Japanese Society for Rights of Authors, Composers, and 
Publishers) on behalf of the copyright holders. For the ringing melody service, 
JASRAC mandated that content providers of ringing melodies should pay a copyright 
fee of five US cents (or 7.7% of the information usage price) to JASRAC. This rule 
was established through the negotiation between JASRAC and NMRC (Network 
Music Rights Conference), which represents nine institutions including Association of 
Musical Electronics Industry, Recording Industry Association of Japan, and Internet 
Association Japan to promote music businesses on the internet.  
This official copyright rule contributed to the smooth launch and subsequent 
growth of the ringing melody business in two ways. First, as anyone can provide the 
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ringing melody service just by paying the copyright fee to JASRAC, a large number of 
CPs entered a highly competitive market. The resulting intensified competition led to 
better and cheaper services. Second, JASRAC effectively repressed the spread of 
illegal services. In the beginning, as ringing melodies were gaining wide popularity, a 
large number of free, unofficial services that neglected to pay copyright fees to 
JASRAC sprung into existence. To counter this undesirable trend, JARAC vigorously 
monitored and charged the copyright violators. By cooling down the movement, 
JASRAC made an important contribution to the establishment of a sound market basis 
for legal services.    
In Korea, most copyright fees were collected by KOMCA (Korea Music 
Copyright Association). In principle, CPs paid 8% of their revenue to KOMCA as the 
copyright fee. The basic structure of the business looked similar to that of Japan. 
However, there existed some seemingly subtle but critical differences that cannot be 
overlooked by those who want strict copyright protection and management. First, the 
copyright fee was charged based on certain percentages of the CP’s total monthly 
revenue, not per melody download. CPs thus could exert larger control on setting their 
service price. Since Korean CPs often provided a variety of content services, such as 
screen savers, they used free ringing melodies as a promotional tool to attract 
subscribers. Second, since Korean mobile carriers and CPs did not make available 
detailed data on melody downloads, copyright management remained inaccurate and 
opaque.       
Copyright holders complained about ineffective copyright management, but 
no significant improvement was made in a timely manner. Indeed, Korea’s 
fundamental problem resided in the fact that general recognition for copyright 
protection in Korea had been comparatively weak among not only users but also 
copyright claimers, such as recording companies, composers, and lyricists, who were 
supposed to be in the position to strongly uphold their rights. Such weak recognition 
stemmed from the structure and history of the Korean music industry.  
First, most recording companies in Korea were small and medium-sized 
firms that lacked the resources and power to command strong copyright protection. 
Until the mid-1980s, the Korean government designated the recording industry as a 
protected sector only for small and medium-sized firms and prohibited large 
conglomerates from entering the business. Although a later deregulation allowed large 
firms to enter the recording industry, none of these bigger firms achieved success. The 
structure of the music industry remained unchanged, and the weak voice of the 
industry could not change Korea’s recognition of copyright protection.  
Second, copyrights were not effectively managed even within the recording 
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industry itself. According to the established practice, small record retailers usually 
neglected to report correct sales revenue so as to avoid taxation. Also, recording 
companies usually gave an advance to artists and producers, and the copyright fee was 
paid only when the record sales reached a pre-negotiated target volume, which rarely 
occurred. Because of such practices, even the recording companies had not been eager 
to build up strong copyright institutions.  
An international comparison on copyright revenue (see Table 3) reveals that 
Korean copyright management is not strict. Compared to Japan and the U.S., copyright 
revenues from copy and distribution were significantly smaller in Korea. This revenue 
structure indicates that illegal copy and distribution were prevalent in Korea. One 
estimate revealed that sales of illegal music copies reached almost one quarter of the 
whole legal market size (100 US million dollars) in 1996. Interestingly, in the later 
stages of the mobile music business development, such weak copyright institutions 
enabled Korea to introduce new mobile music services more swiftly than Japan, as will 
be discussed below.                       
 
4.3. Music Download Service in Japan  
The ringing song (“Chaku-Uta) service, which is an advanced mobile music 
service designed to provide part of an original song, rather than just the melody, was 
launched in December 2002 by KDDI on the 3G mobile communication system. The 
service gained popularity and grew steadily to reach 90 US million dollars in 2004 
with 10 million downloads per month on average. While the other two mobile carriers 
also launched a similar service about one year later, the popularity of the ringing song 
service helped KDDI gain more subscribers as the first provider of this service.                      
The ringing song service and the ringing melody service appear similar; 
however, there was a critical difference between the two services in terms of copyright 
management. Ringing song used part of an original song. Thus, the providers should 
pay a full set of copyright fees for not only the ‘music copyright’ held by the 
composers and lyricists, but also for the ‘music neighboring copyright,’ which includes 
‘copyright in sound recordings.’ The later copyright was usually owned by artists, 
musicians, recording companies, and artist management offices.                              
Music copyrights were collectively managed by JASRAC and other 
registered institutional bodies based on the Copyright Management Business Law. As 
explained above, this institutional arrangement realized a competitive market for the 
ringing melody business. However, neighboring copyrights were controlled by the 
individual claimers, without any formal institution for their collective management. 
When a ringing-song CP wanted to use recorded music, it was compelled to negotiate 
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with and receive permission from the neighboring copyright claimers individually in 
advance. The claimers could exercise exclusive copyrights, and there was thus no 
guarantee for the provider to get permission.              
In the ringing song business, the exclusive usage of neighboring copyrights 
limited the number of CPs competing in the business. Instead of giving permissions to 
other CPs, most recording companies got directly involved in the service, exploiting 
the advantage of their exclusive copyrights on popular music. It was under this 
condition that Label Mobile, a joint venture of 18 Japanese recording companies 
established for the mobile music business, came to take a dominant market share in the 
ringing song business. This CP exclusively provided a large variety of popular songs to 
capture more than 50% of the market share in 2004.                        
The recording companies regarded their dominance in the ringing song 
market as fair rewards. They invested immense resources to make hit music and 
promote star artists. However, in the ringing melody business, those CPs founded by 
former wired-karaoke companies and video game producers, such as GIGA, Xing, 
Dai-ichikosho, and Dwango, took a dominant market share. Those companies easily 
entered the business by paying copyright fees to JASRAC and were highly competitive 
in the business since they could quickly transform their digitalized melodies, originally 
prepared for the karaoke business, for the mobile ringing service. Recording 
companies did not have the capability to compete with these companies. In contrast, in 
the ringing song business, recording companies were protected by neighboring 
copyrights. Facing declining CD sales, recording companies came to recognize the 
ringing song business as a new, attractive market.  
From the consumers’ point of view, however, the ringing song service was 
not fully satisfactory. Some popular songs were not available, once again because of 
the way in which neighboring copyrights are managed and controlled in Japan. In 
contrast to the US and European music industries, there are many cases in Japan in 
which artist management offices or subsidiaries of TV network companies hold 
neighboring copyrights rather than recording companies themselves. Since some of 
these companies did not give permission to recording companies, and instead 
established their own CPs, even Label Mobile could not cover some of the popular 
songs. The ringing song service for these songs was either offered exclusively by 
different CPs or not at all. This was inconvenient for customers, who were forced to 
take the time to find whether and where one could find their favorite songs. 
Furthermore, as each ringing song was provided only by a CP, market competition was 
limited.  
The copyright law endows the copyright claimer with the exclusive right to 
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use. The behavior of these copyright holders was thus legal. However, the business 
structure raised concerns over limited competition. In March 2005, the Japanese Fair 
Trade Commission (JFTC) issued a recommendation for the five leading founders of 
Label Mobile (Avex, Sony Music Entertainment, Toshiba EMI, Universal Music, and 
Victor Entertainment) to permit other CPs to use their music for the ringing song 
service. JFTC argued that the major labels prevented third parties from using 
copyrights without any ‘justifiable’ reasons. Four of the five recording companies, with 
the exception of Toshiba EMI, refused to follow the recommendation, and the case is 
still pending.                     
Although a music creator’s exclusive use of neighboring copyrights caused 
anticompetitive concerns, the condition of the ringing song service improved. 
Stimulated by JFTC, an increasing number of recording companies and artist 
management offices began to issue copyright permission to multiple CPs. The number 
of available ringing songs continuously increased to reach 200,000 on 397 sites as of 
September 2005. 
In the meantime, KDDI launched a full-track music download 
(“Chaku-Uta-Furu) service in November 2004. The new service costs 3 US dollars per 
song and takes 30-40 seconds to download to the handset. A mobile handset can save 
about 40 songs, and an external memory card can increase the storage capacity to more 
than 100 songs. The full-track music download service started with 6 CP sites with 
10,000 songs available and reached 46 sites with 60,000 songs in September 2005. 
According to KDDI, in 2005 while the market for ringing melodies continued to 
slowly decline and that of ringing songs matured, the market for full-track music kept 
rapidly growing. The full-track music service gained an increasing weight within the 
mobile music business as a most advanced service in Japan. As in the case of the 
ringing song service, while there remained some inconveniences for customers and 
anticompetitive concerns in the mobile full-track music business, improvements have 
been being made.                                         
 
4.4. Music Download Service in Korea                            
The ringing song and full-track music download services were together 
introduced in November 2002 by SKT when it launched the 3G content service. Later 
on, the other two carriers also started the same services. Compared to Japan, the 
ringing song service started one month earlier, and the full-track music download 
service began two years earlier in Korea.    
As in the case of the ringing melody service, although the services seem 
similar between the two countries, the business structure under the surface is different. 
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In Japan, because of the exclusive neighboring copyright usage, wired-karaoke or 
game producing companies could not enter the ringing song service market, and 
recording companies won a dominant market share. In contrast, in Korea, former 
ringing melody CPs, which were mostly those firms specialized in information and 
communication technologies, could diversify into the ringing song and full-track music 
download services. Recording companies or artists management offices could not enter 
the business. It was the Korean mobile carriers that had designed and controlled the 
business structure by exploiting their relatively strong power against recording 
companies.       
Upon starting new services, SKT launched an integrated site where 
consumers could search and download music. Though many CPs worked behind the 
site to arrange copyright issues and develop digital files, consumers could not 
recognize individual CPs, and the mobile carrier controlled the services more directly 
than before and in Japan. The Korean mobile carriers claimed 30% of the service 
revenue as a handling fee, which was much higher than the fee (10%) for the ringing 
melody service and than KDDI’s fee (9%) for the same services in Japan. This 
difference indicates the strong power of the Korean carriers.    
Another difference is that in Korea in 2003, right after ringing song and 
full-track music download services started, numerous public and private organizations 
were newly established to collectively manage and mediate neighboring copyrights. 
Such institutions to manage neighboring copyrights did not exist in Japan or in any 
other countries. These organizations simplified the cumbersome process of copyright 
negotiation and coordination and systemized copyright management. By getting 
copyright permission from these organizations, CPs, backed by carriers, could provide 
most of popular Korean music by paying standard copyright fees.    
Why were such new institutions established in Korea? First, previous 
experiences of the Korean music industry in the PC-based internet music service, 
which was filled with confusion and crisis, were influential.   
Since 2000, as one of the most advanced PC-based internet network in the 
world diffused in Korea, free music services, such as Bugsmusic (music streaming 
service) and Soribada (peer-to-peer file download service) caused devastating effects 
on the music industry. Bugsmusic and Soribada attracted 8 million and 20 million 
users, respectively. To force these companies to respect copyrights, the recording 
industry and copyright holders had engaged in many rounds of legal and political 
haggling, which took five years.  
There were other failures. The first online music download service was 
launched as early as 1997 and was based on home PC-VAN (Valued Added Network). 
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However, the service survived for only one year and was abandoned because of the 
failure of copyright negotiations among recording companies, VAN providers, and CPs. 
Also, recording companies launched their own internet download service in 1999; 
however, the service could not survive as it was severely oppressed by free illegal 
music services. These bitter experiences drove an urgent need for establishing 
well-ordered institutions for managing music copyrights.   
The second reason such collective neighboring copyright management 
services were developed in Korea was related to the Korean government’s beneficial 
policy to promote the online digital content business. After the financial crisis in 1997, 
the Korean government began strategically promoting the cultural content industry as a 
new dynamo for economic development. It recognized that music copyrights should be 
used more openly in the internet environment.  
These two factors – bitter industry experiences and influential government 
policy – together prompted the establishment of new institutions, including KAPP 
(Korean Association of Phonogram Producers). It was established in March 2003 as 
the first public organization in the world to collectively manage neighboring 
copyrights for the online music business. In the beginning, 82 relatively small 
recording companies entrusted their music copyrights to KAPP, and 9 online music 
business operators subscribed to the copyright usage program. However, four major 
recording companies opposed the idea of entrusting copyrights to a third party, and 
they jointly founded Manine Media, a private copyright publisher designed to manage 
copyrights for these recording companies. In addition, many other private publishing 
companies were also established.       
Supported by these institutions and well-established control by powerful 
mobile communication carriers, the mobile music business expanded rapidly and 
outgrew the offline music business in market size in 2004 (Table 2). The mobile music 
services thus became an important revenue source for recording companies, which 
could not benefit from the PC-based internet and subsequently suffered from the 
decline of their traditional off-line business. However, this does not mean that 
everybody was happy. Recording companies were far from being satisfied with the 
mobile carriers’ excessive and growing control over the music business.     
 
4.5. Ubiquitous Music Service in Korea  
The mobile music business in Korea moved further ahead when SKT started 
the U-Music (Ubiquitous Music) service in November 2004. The other two carriers 
soon started a similar service. Breaking down the barrier between mobile and fixed 
internets, the U-Music service provided both full-track music in MP3 format and 
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music streaming. Consumers could play music on their mobile handsets, PCs, and 
other portable devices. In contrast to previous services, mobile carriers internalized the 
new business. They directly provided the service by themselves, and no CPs were 
allowed to enter the business. The U-music service by LGT and SKT attracted 2 
million and 2.3 million subscribers, respectively, as of July 2005.   
The development of this new service was led by the introduction of MP3 
phones. The MP3 phone is equipped with the capacity to play MP3 files, and caused 
serious conflicts of interest among related industries. The key issue was whether MP3 
phones should be compatible with the exiting MP3 files saved on users’ PCs. Most of 
MP3 files were illegally downloaded through PC-based internet. A possible serious 
problem was that once MP3 phones became fully compatible with existing PC MP3 
files, they would not only destroy the existing mobile music business, but also damage 
future development of the online music business as a whole. 
While handset manufacturers wanted to produce fully compatible handsets to 
stimulate a rapid diffusion, record companies understandably opposed such a plan and 
demanded full incompatibility with the existing illegal files. Mobile carriers stayed 
closer to recording companies, calculating the potential of the music download market. 
Through government mediation, a tentative agreement to limit the replaying time of 
illegal files to 72 hours was about to be made.  
Suddenly, LG Telecom, the smallest mobile communication carrier in Korea, 
withdrew from the negotiations and began selling fully compatible MP3 phones to gain 
a market share. Their decision was in line with the interests of LG Electronics, the 
handset manufacturer in the LG group. LGT introduced unregulated MP3 phones and 
successfully increased subscriber numbers. Carefully watching this success, the other 
mobile carriers also began providing fully compatible mobile handsets. As MP3 
phones blurred the boundaries between fixed and mobile internets, mobile carriers 
came to fully realize the most advanced mobile music business by launching U-Music 
services.    
However, these moves by the carriers seriously offended the music industry. 
KPPA, recording companies, and other music creators legally and politically fought 
back against LGT’s selfish decision. In November 2004, they reached an agreement 
that LGT would provide 10 million US dollar to fund development in the music 
industry and would pay 80% of their revenue as a copyright fee. Under these 
conditions, LGT was allowed to provide free U-Music service for six months, and 
gained copyright usage permission for 1.3 million songs. 
Without much coordination in advance, SKT started the U-Music service 
with only 900,000 songs. Although SKT paid 48% of the revenue as a copyright fee, it 
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never satisfied copyright claimers. In an attempt to strengthen its own music business 
and bargaining power over other recording companies, SKT acquired YBM Seoul 
Records, which was one of the largest recording companies in Korea. By entering the 
PC-based internet market, mobile carriers initiated competition with companies in that 
market. Relationships among related businesses would become further complicated, 
and it remains to be seen what kind of order will emerge within the mobile music 
ecosystem in Korea. 
 
5. Discussion and Implications    
Our observations show that the development of the mobile music business 
could not be fully explained by looking solely at the mobile music business served by 
CPs. For a better understanding, it was necessary to look at complex interactions 
among related businesses (the mobile music business ecosystem), including the mobile 
carriers, handset producers, recording companies, and artist management offices.    
Technological changes determined which businesses would be involved. In 
the beginning, ringing melodies were manually input by users. The development of 
mobile internet then realized the potential to distribute ready-made melody files. Next, 
new technologies made it possible to distribute parts of original songs and, ultimately, 
full-track music. Finally, the U-Music service broke down the barrier between mobile 
and PC-based internets. As technologies advanced, the scope of relevant businesses 
expanded. On each occasion, new expectations as well as new concerns emerged, and 
negotiations and coordination were needed to build a new order. The process was not 
technologically determined, but rather socially constructed. Although the same 
technologies were adopted in the mobile music industries of both Japan and Korea, the 
business development in each country was embedded in the society and history and 
correspondingly took divergent paths.        
One factor that shaped the developmental path was the inter-industry power 
structure. In Korea, the power of recording companies was weaker than that of mobile 
carriers and handset manufactures. In contrast, recording companies and artist 
management offices in Japan maintained relatively stronger power over others. We 
were able to capture such a difference by examining the winners and losers in the 
mobile music business of the two countries. In ringing melody service of Japan, the, 
wired-karaoke companies and game companies were successful, while recording 
companies and content creators dominated the ringing song and full-track music 
download services. In Korea, by contrast, technology-based CPs succeeded in the 
ringing melody service. Mobile carriers then took control of the ringing song and 
full-track music download services. In the U-Music service, they integrated the service, 
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thereby kicking out incumbent CPs.       
Another critical factor which affected the development path was music 
copyright institutions, to which we paid special attention as a reverse salient of the 
mobile music business ecosystem. Under Japan’s firmly established copyright 
institutions, copyright claimers and content creators could exert strong influence. 
Negotiations between these well-trenched copyright holders and other businesses 
consumed energy and time, and, as the boundaries of the business ecosystem expanded, 
the development of new services was slowed down.    
In Korea, with a repeated pattern of ‘service first and negotiation second,’ 
new services were rapidly introduced. Under weak copyright institutions, companies 
with technological capabilities could take leadership in developing new services to 
their advantage, while the market of music content remained relatively small3 . 
However, a counter movement to strengthen music copyright institutions has been 
made. Both public and private organizations were established to collectively manage 
and mediate neighboring copyright usage. The recording industry also strengthened its 
voice and political influence and somehow prevented LGT from making extreme 
advancements in the market. 
A higher priority on copyright protection in Japan slowed the speed of new 
business introduction, and emphasis on technological advancement in Korea brought 
confusion and disorder in business development. These problems vividly attest to the 
common difficulty of achieving a delicate balance between copyright protection and 
technology-led business creations. In essence, there is no difference between Japan and 
Korea in that copyright institutions influenced the direction and speed of the business 
development.       
Overall, this paper has demonstrated that, in order to gain better 
understanding of how a new business is created and developed over time, it is 
beneficial to raise our analytical focus to the level of the business ecosystem and to pay 
attention to the role of a reverse salient in the shaping of the whole system 
development.  
As Henderson and Clark (1990) indicated, technological innovations could 
cause two types of changes in a product system: one within individual components, 
                                                 
3 Because of different populations (Japan 127 million: Korea 48 million in 2003) and per capita GDP 
(32,850 US dollars: 14,118 US dollars in 2004), a simple comparison may be misleading. However, the 
music market size (6,315 million US dollar: 335 million US dollars in 2004) and the music copyright fee 
revenue (930 million US dollars: 40 million US dollars in 2002) in Korea was much smaller than in 
Japan, compared to the total national private consumption (2.4 trillion US dollar: 0.3 trillion US dollar 
in 2003), the number of domestic automobile sales (5.7 million: 1.6 million in 2002), and the number of 
domestic PC sales (1.2 million: 0.3 million in 2002). 
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and the other in the relationship among different components. In a similar vein, 
changes in business ecosystem can be classified into two categories: 1) changes in 
individual business, and 2) changes in the relationship among different types of related 
businesses. In the former case, business development may be effectively grasped by 
the traditional analytical concepts of industrial organization economics and 
competitive strategy research. However, for the later case, we need to shift our 
analytical viewpoint to that of the business ecosystem, which would arouse special 
attention to inter-business relationship. This analytical viewpoint is expected to be of 
great value for the ICT fields, where frequent technological innovations produce 
wide-spreading impacts across a variety of businesses, as in the case of the mobile 
music business.           
When we elevate the analytical level from that of an individual business to a 
collection of businesses, we come to find out that non-economic factors, such as power 
structure, societal values, and underlying history, play significant roles in driving the 
business development. Each business has its market, and the market competition more 
or less defines how the business should be run and developed if the changes are limited 
to those within the business itself. Customer voices somehow declare winners and 
loser through competition. However, inter-business relationships cannot be fixed by 
market competition, because there is no common market between different businesses. 
Therefore, if the changes go beyond an individual business, non-economic factors are 
likely to matter more. A change in the level of analysis thus implies a change in factors 
to be examined. Those firms that want to prosper by creating a new business need to 
pay as much attention to social and political factors as to technology development and 
market competition. 
In order to explore the proposed approach and its academic and practical 
implications, we need to further elaborate our analytical viewpoint and empirical data, 
both of which are still sketchy in this paper, to build a more rigorous framework with 
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Table 1.  
Mobile Music Services in Japan and Korea  
Name, Start Time 




A service that allows subscribers to download a melody to be used 
as a mobile handset’s ring tone. NTT DoCoMo started the service 
first in Japan, and all the three mobile carriers started at almost the 









A service that allows phone call receivers to choose melodies for 
their callers to listen to while waiting for the receivers to answer. 
SKT in Korea first started this service, and NTT DoCoMo in 









A service that allows subscribers to download part of an original 
music (30-45 seconds) song to be used as the mobile handset’s 
ring tone. It became technologically possible with the introduction 











A service that allows subscribers to download full-track music to 
be replayed on their mobile handset. Consumers can enjoy the 
music itself rather than using it as a ring tone. SKT in Korea 
started the full music and music video download service together, 











A service that allows subscribers to download full-track music via 
both mobile and PC-based internet, to be replayed on MP3 
phones, PCs, and portable MP3 players on monthly fee basis. 
Subscribers can also enjoy streaming music to mobile handsets 
and PCs. SKT and LGT in Korea first launched the service. It is 





1. The service name is not a general term, but the most popular name used by particular firms.  
2. Before the mobile internet ringing melody, a similar service was provided in SMS format in both 
countries. In addition, full-track music download service was provided on PHS networks earlier in 
Japan. However, none of these previous services used internet as the distribution channel.        
18 
                             Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/6-52
Table 2.  
The Music Business Market in Japan and Korea 
Unit: Million US Dollar 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Offline  6,174 5,934 5,808 5,319  5,202 
Online  134 519 689 929  1,149 
 PC-based Internet - 16 25 32  50 
 Mobile Internet 134 503 664 897  1,099 
Total 6,308 6,453 6,497 6,248  6,351 
Japan  
 
Offline  410 373 286 183  134 
Online  44 91 134 184  201 
 PC-based Internet 14 28 5 8  17 
 Mobile Internet 30 63 129 176  184 
Korea 
Total  454 464 420 367  335 
Note:  
1. The data exclude the karaoke, concert, and broadcasting markets, while including the rental CD 
market. 
2. No data is available for the PC-based internet market in 2000 in Japan.  
3. There are different statistics available for the Japanese mobile internet market. For instance, MCA, 
Inc. estimated 700 million US dollar in 2001, 980 million US dollars in 2002, and 1.1 billion US 
dollars in 2003. This estimate is larger than the number shown in this table. MCA also estimated 
that the ringing melody service accounted for 50% of the total, which is larger than the number 
shown in this table (40%). 















                             Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/6-52
Table 3.  
Music Industry Royalties in the U.S., Japan, and Korea (2001) 
Unit: Million US Dollars, % 
 U.S.A. Japan Korea World 
Performance-Based Income 914.7 47.1 358.9 38.5 34.0 82.1 3,686.3 49.0 
Reproduction-Based Income 655.0 33.8 432.4 46.4 7.2 17.5 2,754.0 36.6 
Distribution-Based Income 331.9 17.1 56.3 6.0 0.2 0.4 812.8 10.8 
Interest Investment Income 37.1 1.9 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 168.8 2.2 
Miscellaneous Income 1.8 0.1 83.3 8.9 0.0 0.0 99.5 1.3 
Total 1,940.4 100.0 931.6 100.0 41.4 100.0 7,521.3 100.0 
Note: 
1. Performance-Based Income includes radio, TV/Cable/Satellite, and live performance. 
Reproduction-Based Income includes phono mechanical, synchronization, private copy, and reprint of 
printed music. Distribution-Based Income includes sales of printed music and rental/public lending.  
2. The left column is income and right column is percentage for each country. Data in the World column 
includes 49 leading countries.  
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Appendix: A Short History of Mobile Music Business in Japan and Korea 
Japan Korea
1996 7 AMEI,JASRAC, and wired-karaoke companies reached an tentative agreement
on copyright fee guideline.
9 Mobile handset with  ringing melody function was first introduced in Japan.
1997 3 NTT DoCoMo started mobile data communication service.
5 Home PC-VAN companies started music download service.
6 Toyo Astel started ringing melody service for PHS handset.
8 Network Music Rights Conference (NMRC）was founded.
9 AMEI, JASRAC, and wired-Karaoke companies agreed on the official copyright
fee guideline. /NMRC proposed JASRAC to hold regular meetings to coordinate
network music copyrights.
1998 5 Home PC-VAN companies stopped music download service after copyright
coordination failed with recording companies.
7 A guide book to input ringing melody manually made bestseller.
11 JASRAC and NMRC reached a tentative agreement on network copyright fee.
1999 2 NTT DoCoMo launched i-mode service. Yaho started ringing melody service in SMS format. /Korean government
legislated Cultural Industry Promotion Law.
6 GIGA Networks started free manual ringing melody guide on i-mode to NTT
DoCoMo subscribers.
9 GIGA Networks commercialized manual ringing melody guide.
10 Doremi Record launched Doremi Music, an MP3 download service on PC-based
Internet.
11 Korean government officially announced the policy to deregulate collective
institutional body to mediate music neighboring copyright.
12 GIGA Networks started ringing melody download service on i-mode to NTT
DoCoMo subscribers. /Sony Entertainment launched Bit-Music, a music
download service on PC-based Internet.
2000 2 Bugsmusic started free music streaming service on PC-based Internet.
4 JASRAC and NMRC reached the second tentative agreement./ Major recording
companies launched Labelgate,a joint venture for Internet music download
service.
5 Soribada started free P2P file exchange service.
7 Music copyright was revised to recognize Digital Transmission Right.
8 JASRAC and NMRC agreed on the official network copyright fee. Yaho started mobile Internet ringing melody service with three mobile carriers.
11 DDI Pocket started Keitaide Music service.
2001 1 NTT DoCoMo started M-stage Music. Music copyright institituions and recording companies brought case against
Soribada.
6 Korean Ministry of Culture and Tourism announced Contents Korea Vision 21,
the cultural content industry promotion plan.
7 Major recording companies founded Label Mobile, a joint venture for ringing
song service.
10 NTT DoCoMo started FOMA as 3G mobile service. /Copyright Management
Business Law took efect.
11 Music copyright institutional bodies and recording companies brought case
against Bugsmusic.
2002 3 Witcom started ring-back song service to SKT subscribers.
4 KDDI started 3G mobile telecommunication service in CDMA 2000 1x
standard.
5 KTF launched Fimm, the 3G mobile telecommunication service.
11 KDDI started ringing song service. SKT launched JUNE as 3G content service, and started ringing song and full-
track music download services.
12 Vodafone started Vodafone Global Standard, the 3G mobile telecommunication
service.
2003 2 Korean government announced First Online Digital Contents Industry
Development Plan(2003-2005）.
3 KAPP, the government-recognized agency,  was established to collectively
manage and mediate music neighboring copyright.
4 Manine Media, the private copyright publishing organization, was founded by
major recording company.
9 NTT DoCoMo started Merodi-Coru(ring-back song) service.
12 Vodafone launched ringing song service.
2004 1 NTT DoCoMo started Chaku-Motion(ringing song) service.
3 Bugsmusic announced to stop free service and to observe official copyright
guideline. /Negotiation to regulate MP3Phone failed.
4 Labelgate renewed its PC-based music download service as Mora. LGT started to sell unregulated MP3 phones.
8 Fair Trade Commission began investigating antitrust concerns about Label
Mobile.
9 KDDI launched full-track music download service.
11 SKT started Mellon, the U-Music service. LGT reached copyright agreement
with music copyright institutional bodies and recording companies.
12 Vodafone launched longer version of ringing song download service. LGT started Music On, the U-Music service with free 6-month promotion plan.
2005 1 Recording companies were recognized to hold Digital Transmission Right.
3 Fair Trade Commission issued recommendation to five major founders of Label
Mobile to allow the useage of ringing song copyrights more openly.
Music copyright institutional bodies acquired 60 percent of Bugsmusic's
ownership.
5 KTF launched Dosirak, the U-Music service. SKT acquired YBM Seoul
Records.
7 LGT began charging Music On service.
8 Vodafone started full-track music download service. /Apple launched iTunes
Music Store in Japan.
Court ordered Soribada to stop service.
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